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1 Information disclosure under liability: an experiment on public bads*

2 Julien Jacob[†], Eve-Angéline Lambert[‡], Mathieu Lefebvre[§], Sarah Van Driessche[¶]

3 **Abstract**

4
5 We experimentally investigate the impact of information disclosure on managing
6 common harms that are caused jointly by a group of liable agents. Subjects interact
7 in a public bad setting and must choose *ex ante* how much to contribute in order
8 to reduce the probability of causing a common damage. If a damage occurs, subjects
9 bear a part of the loss according to the liability-sharing rule in force. We consider two
10 existing rules: a per capita rule and a proportional rule. Our aim is to analyze the
11 relative impact of information disclosure under each rule. We show that information
12 disclosure increases contributions only under a per capita rule. This result challenges
13 the classical results regarding the positive effects of information disclosure, since we
14 show that this impact may depend upon the legal context. We also show that while
15 a proportional rule leads to higher contributions than a per capita one, the positive
16 effect of disclosure on a per capita rule makes it as efficient as a proportional rule
17 without information disclosure.

18 **Keywords:** Information disclosure; Common harms; Environmental Regulation; Lia-
19 bility Sharing Rules; Public Bads; Multiple Tortfeasors

20 **JEL Classification:** C92; H41; K13; K32; Q53

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1 Introduction

2 Programs that disclose information about firms' environmental performance are increas-
3 ingly used as a "third wave" in the regulation of pollution, in addition to market-based
4 and command-and-control instruments. Disclosure strategies include public and/or private
5 attempts to make information on pollution available to consumers, workers, shareholders,
6 and the public at large (Tietenberg, 1998). *Public* programs, i.e., those enforced by a pub-
7 lic authority, are many and varied, and can take place both at national and regional levels.
8 Prominent examples of national public disclosure programs include, among others, the US
9 Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) and Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP), but
10 other programs have also emerged in many countries, such as in India with the Green
11 Rating Project (GRP) (Powers et al., 2011) or more recently in the European Union (see
12 e.g., Directive 2018-851). Other examples of public programs can be found at local level
13 (e.g., livestreaming pollution disclosure, see Huet-Vaughn et al., 2018). Information dis-
14 closure may also be *private*, meaning that information is conveyed by non-governmental
15 organizations or even citizens (Pien, 2020).

16 Information disclosure is a particularly interesting tool for several reasons. First, from a
17 political viewpoint, disclosure is more acceptable than some direct regulations perceived
18 as more coercive (Schatz, 2008). Second, the impact of disclosure programs is widely rec-
19 ognized in the literature as a way of significantly decreasing pollution, especially through
20 the enforcement of performance evaluation, rating programs, and toxic release inventories.
21 Several studies have highlighted a positive impact of such programs on pollution abatement
22 (see e.g., Blackman et al., 2004; García et al., 2007; Benneer and Olmstead, 2008; García
23 et al., 2009; Powers et al., 2011; Huet-Vaughn et al., 2018). Finally, the cost incurred by
24 countries is low, as the information gathering cost is borne by civil society (Jacquet and
25 Jamieson, 2016). These advantages explain why information disclosure, although under-
26 utilized as a policy tool in the past (Schatz, 2008), has been increasingly debated and
27 has often been included in countries' strategies to prevent environmental harms, both at
28 national and local levels.

29 However, information disclosure mechanisms are additional to existing regulatory mea-
30 sures. In the case of pollution incidents or environmental accidents, information disclosure
31 complements existing regulations based on civil liability. Civil liability in general, and in

1 the environmental field in particular, allows third parties to be compensated and/or the
2 clean-up costs of hazardous sites to be financed *ex post*, as well as providing incentives
3 to invest *ex ante* in safety measures to avoid harms. In practice, two different rules of
4 apportionment of liability can be applied: a per capita rule and a proportional rule. Ac-
5 cording to the per capita rule, which is in force in most European countries, each of the n
6 contributors has to compensate for $1/n$ of the common harm.¹ Regarding the proportional
7 rule, which is used in the US and especially in CERCLA,² the share each contributor has
8 to pay negatively depends on their relative investment in avoiding harm, compared to the
9 investments of the others.³

10 The aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, we want to investigate whether there is
11 a positive impact of information disclosure mechanisms when civil liability is introduced
12 and determine whether information disclosure enhances the efficiency of liability rules in
13 *ex ante* investment in safety. On the other hand, our aim is to assess whether the influence
14 of an identification mechanism is different depending on which liability rule is enforced and
15 thus to analyze the efficiency of information disclosure mechanisms in relative terms. To
16 this end, we conducted a laboratory experiment to analyze incentives to make investments
17 in safety. We adopted a public bad setting in which players can contribute to reducing
18 the probability of a fixed common loss, which is shared (through the apportionment of
19 liability) among the group members if it occurs. The first two treatments introduced infor-
20 mation disclosure through a so-called “identification” mechanism highlighting the lowest
21 contributors, under the liability rule in place, i.e., either per capita (in one treatment) or
22 proportional (in another treatment).⁴ The experimental literature on public good games
23 has shown that the identification of the lowest contributors is more effective than rec-
24 ognizing the highest contributors (Samek and Sheremeta, 2014). In order to identify the

¹The 2004/35/CE Directive on environmental liability stipulates that “Member States may establish national rules covering cost allocation in cases of multiple party causation. Member States may take into account, in particular, the specific situation of users of products who might not be held responsible for environmental damage in the same conditions as those producing such products. In this case, apportionment of liability should be determined in accordance with national law.” Hence, Germany and France have both chosen to enforce a per capita sharing when several agents are responsible for a common harm (see German Federal Ministry of Justice (2022) paragraph 426 for the case of Germany, and Hocquet-Berg (2017) for the case of France).

²The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), in its Section 113(f), allows for proportional liability in case of indivisible harm (see Kornhauser and Revesz, 1989; Pinkowski, 1996; Ferrey, 2009). An example is the Colorado vs. ASARCO, Inc case in 1985.

³Note here that if each tortfeasor invests the same amount, then the two rules are obviously equivalent.

⁴Note that the terms “recognition mechanism” and “naming mechanism” could also have been used instead of “identification mechanism”.

1 relative impact of disclosure on investments, we ran two additional treatments with the
2 same two liability rules, but without disclosure.

3 Our experimental design is well suited to take into account the fact that most environ-
4 mental harms are caused by a multitude of agents. A recent example is the pollution of
5 England’s rivers by water companies (see EPA, 2021). Water companies have to treat
6 sewage before releasing it into rivers. But in case of exceptional circumstances (e.g., after
7 extreme rainfall), they are allowed to directly discharge sewage into rivers, without having
8 treated it, in order to relieve pressure in the sewerage system. However, data shows that
9 in 2019 and in 2020, the amount of sewage released by water companies was far beyond
10 the normal quantity, thus increasing the risk of occurrence of environmental harms. This
11 means that several water companies have made insufficient investments in the treatment of
12 sewage before releasing it into rivers, which leads to an increase in the (risk of) occurrence
13 of environmental harms. Such investments could consist in designing and operating their
14 own wastewater treatment plants.⁵ In such situations of collectively generated damage,
15 civil liability must apportion liability among the multiple injurers who contributed to a
16 single common damage.

17 Our results show that while a proportional liability rule leads to higher investments than
18 a per capita rule, the introduction of a disclosure mechanism increases investments only
19 under a per capita rule. A per capita rule combined with information disclosure would
20 appear to be as efficient as a proportional rule without information disclosure. The fact that
21 the impact of disclosure is higher under a per capita rule than under a proportional rule
22 can be explained by a higher reputation effect from being recognized as a low contributor
23 under a per capita rule than under a proportional one.⁶ With a proportional rule, a low
24 investment in the prevention of the risk results in a higher share of damages to be paid
25 in case of a harm occurring. To some extent, the worst contributors pay a “fair share”,
26 relative to their contribution to the expected harm: to some extent, a “polluter-pays”
27 principle applies. The worst contributors take responsibility for their decisions. Under per

⁵Another example of such investments is provided by Foulon et al. (2002) as regards the pulp and paper industry in British Columbia (Canada): since 1990, plants are required to use a secondary wastewater treatment process if they are allowed to operate.

⁶As to the identification of the lowest contributors, in practice information is gathered about all contributions, but only the lowest contributors are made publicly identified. Considering again the example of water pollution in the UK, the Environment Agency yearly conducts a global assessment of pollution from water companies and publishes a ranking of them as regards their environmental performance. See Environment Agency of United Kingdom (2022) for an example.

1 capita, this mechanism cannot come into play as shares are independent of contributions,
2 so that a low contribution imposes a high externality on other contributors. In that case,
3 a low contribution can be perceived as a signal for being a free rider.

4 This paper is thus closely related to the recent literature on the effects of information
5 disclosure on firms' environmental performance. Most of them study the enforcement of
6 information disclosure and conclude that there is a positive impact (Blackman et al., 2004;
7 Powers et al., 2011; Huet-Vaughn et al., 2018; Pien, 2020). Foulon et al. (2002) proposed
8 an original contribution by empirically analyzing the impact of fines and penalties on
9 the one hand, and the impact of information disclosure on the other. They found that
10 disclosure creates additional incentives for pollution control. Our findings partly challenge
11 this result, as we find mixed results of the impact of disclosure, depending on which liability
12 rule applies.⁷ Most of these studies are based on field data, and in particular two of them
13 are based on plant-level survey data (namely, Blackman et al., 2004 and Powers et al.,
14 2011). Although they all provide very useful information, they do not avoid endogeneity
15 issues related to the different legal contexts and environmental issues. The originality of our
16 work lies in the methodology used. Our experimental design allows us both to distinguish
17 the impact of disclosure on subjects' behavior and to compare the liability rules with (and
18 without) disclosure. Obviously, such a 2x2 design could hardly be found in the field.

19 Our paper is also partly in line with the literature on public goods and the identification
20 of contributors, with the latter being enforced through what is referred to as *naming*
21 *and shaming* low contributors. A series of public goods experiments have shown that
22 naming contributors by revealing their identity affects contribution levels (Andreoni and
23 Petrie, 2004; Rege and Telle, 2004; Soetevent, 2005; Samek and Sheremeta, 2014). Samek
24 and Sheremeta (2014) noted that the shame from being a low contributor is a more
25 powerful motivation for giving than the prestige of being recognized as a high contributor.

26 Several studies have also investigated how players behave in a public bad setting, i.e.,
27 when the probability or size of a common event (a loss) is affected by the group's decisions
28 (e.g., Sonnemans et al., 1998; Keser and Montmarquette, 2008; Boun My and Ouvrard,

⁷Note also that some papers have investigated the channels through which information disclosure leads firms to reduce emissions. Konar and Cohen (1997) notably identified that a stock price decline due to information disclosure would lead firms to subsequently change their environmental behavior. The impact of such disclosure on firms' financial performance has been analyzed in other papers (see e.g., Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2010; Gonenc and Scholtens, 2017).

1 2019; Flambard et al., 2020). For instance, Blanco et al. (2016, 2017) and Walker and
2 Gardner (1992) used appropriation games to address this issue. In these games, each
3 token appropriated from the group fund generates both a deterministic and a probabilistic
4 degradation. The probability of occurrence of the loss decreases with greater cooperation.
5 These common-pool resource games are particularly relevant in the context of climate
6 change, where resource overexploitation (e.g., deforestation) can lead to an increased risk
7 of serious climatic events. In this paper, a contribution game seemed more appropriate
8 since we consider costly investments that reduce the risk of a common damage occurring.⁸
9 However, none of these studies, to our knowledge, has introduced name and shame devices
10 in a public bad setting. Yet disclosure of low contributors should also play an important
11 role in the avoidance of a common loss.

12 Finally, this paper is related to the law and economics literature on liability which has
13 been quite extensively analyzed theoretically (Calabresi, 1970; Brown, 1973; Shavell, 1980)
14 and has been identified as a means of reducing pollution (Kornhauser and Revesz, 1989,
15 1990; Endres and Bertram, 2006; Endres et al., 2008). Still from a theoretical perspective,
16 some papers on liability have also investigated how this legal framework interacts with
17 moral concerns in providing incentives to manage risky activities (Deffains and Fluet,
18 2013; Buchens et al., 2019). However, from an empirical perspective, no comparison of
19 liability rules has been made on field data, and few experiments have been performed.
20 Exceptions are Kornhauser and Schotter (1990, 1992), who test, in a single-actor (uni-
21 lateral) and double-actor (bilateral) accident framework, the effects of strict liability and
22 negligence on the reduction of a risk of unilateral accident and a risk of bilateral accident
23 respectively. Angelova et al. (2014) also compare strict liability and negligence in terms
24 of efficiency in reducing the probability of an accident. Using two precaution levels (care
25 vs. no care), they find that both liability rules provide socially efficient incentives, but
26 that roughly half of the subjects also invest in care under a no-law setting, where subjects
27 cannot be sanctioned for not contributing. Finally, Deffains et al. (2019) compare a no-
28 law setting with the two liability rules (strict liability vs. negligence) and implement two

⁸Each subject can benefit from a reduced risk even if they did not contribute to it (non-excludable), and the fact that a subject enjoys that reduced risk (of having to pay for liability in case of harm) does not prevent another subject enjoying it as well (non-rivalrous). Thus, the two properties of a public good are satisfied in the case we consider.

1 legal obligation enforcement levels (mild vs. severe).⁹ They show that individuals trade
2 off private benefits, net of legal liability, against the net uncompensated losses caused to
3 others. Attanasi et al. (2020) study a situation of strict liability where a firm can not
4 only make costly investments to reduce the probability of a catastrophic event occurring
5 but can also take out insurance to be (partially) compensated in case of an accident. In
6 a sequential game, the insurance company first proposes a contract to the firm. Then,
7 the firm decides simultaneously on its level of investment and whether or not to buy the
8 insurance. The authors find that investments to reduce the probability of damage and
9 insurance against their adverse consequences are substitutes. Finally, on the liability side,
10 the closest paper to ours is that of Jacob et al. (2022) who experimentally compare the
11 efficiency of two liability rules, i.e., joint and several liability and several (only) liability,
12 in terms of incentives for (potentially insolvent) subjects to make investments to reduce
13 the size of a damage which will occur with certainty. Our experiment differs from theirs
14 in several respects. First, and most importantly, information disclosure is not taken into
15 account in their paper which focuses on liability rules only. Second, we adopt a public bad
16 setting, which seems relevant to consider more than two subjects interacting with each
17 other in order to reduce a common harm. Third, we consider that investments reduce the
18 probability (and not the size) of harm, relating to other types of environmental harms.
19 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we display the experimental design and a
20 simple theoretical model that allows us to derive predictions. Section 3 presents the results
21 from our experiment, while Section 4 concludes and discusses the potential implications
22 of this research.

23 **2 Experimental design and hypotheses**

24 **2.1 Design**

The experiment consists of a repeated game played by groups of four subjects for 20 periods. Following Andreoni and Petrie (2004), the composition of each group is randomly

⁹Under severe law, subjects always have to compensate perfectly for any harm caused to others, i.e., the probability of detection is assumed to be 100%; under mild law, the probability of detection is 50% only.

changed every five periods.¹⁰ While a repeated game moves us away from our (static) theoretical model of Subsection 2.2, it gives us the opportunity to observe group dynamics and learning within 5 given periods (see Andreoni (1988) and a plethora of follow-up studies). At the beginning of the experiment, each subject is endowed with 200 ECUs so that any group member is able to fully compensate for a potential loss of the same amount. In addition, at the start of each period, subjects receive an endowment of 19 ECUs¹¹ and have to decide, simultaneously and without the possibility of communicating with the other group members, how many of those ECUs they are willing to invest in order to reduce the probability of a loss of 200 ECUs affecting their group. Since we assume risk neutrality and no insolvency, offering the subjects the opportunity to reduce the probability of a loss or to reduce the magnitude of the loss does not affect the theoretical predictions (see the next section). For an experiment in which the subjects have the possibility to reduce the magnitude of a loss and may be unable to pay for the harm they cause, the interested reader can refer to Jacob et al. (2022). Note that this loss will be shared between the members depending on the rule in place, as explained below. The probability of occurrence of this loss diminishes as the contributions of the four group members increase, and is given by the following function:

$$p(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l) = \frac{1}{1 + \alpha(x_i + x_j + x_k + x_l)} \quad (1)$$

1 where x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l are the individual contributions to decreasing the probability, $i =$
2 $1, 2, 3, 4, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, k = 1, 2, 3, 4, l = 1, 2, 3, 4, i \neq j \neq k \neq l$ denoting the four subjects,
3 and α is set at 0.19.¹² If none of the four subjects contributes, the probability is 1 and
4 the loss occurs with certainty. On the contrary, if all four subjects contribute their entire

¹⁰In Andreoni and Petrie (2004), the composition of the groups changes every 8 periods, for a total of 40 periods.

¹¹We decided to give subjects 19 ECUs rather than 20 ECUs in order to avoid decisions based on heuristics such as focal points where subjects choose a given proportion (one quarter, one half, and so on) of their endowment (on this point, see notably Cohen et al., 1996).

¹²The value of α is not directly related to the value of the endowment (of 19 ECUS) but results from the following trade-off: a low value of α leads to a high marginal benefit from investing, which may lead to a corner solution ($x_i = 19$). Conversely, a high value of α leads to a low marginal benefit from investing, which reduces both the levels of the equilibrium values of x (in each of the four treatments we consider, see later) but also the difference between these equilibrium values, which could cause difficulties for the comparison between treatments in the empirical analysis. Overall, the value of 0.19 is, in our setup, the value which makes the best trade-off between the necessity to have interior solutions, and sufficiently different equilibrium values.

1 endowment (19 ECUs), the probability falls to zero and no harm can occur.¹³ In order
 2 to facilitate the subjects' decision making, a table displaying the probability for every
 3 possible contribution is presented in the instructions.¹⁴ The experiment is completely
 4 decontextualized so that only neutral terms such as gain, loss or contribution are used.

5 We consider four different treatments (see Table 1). In the so-called Per Capita treatment
 6 (PC-A),¹⁵ the loss is shared equally between the four members of the group. Denoting
 7 γ_i^{PC} the share of the loss a subject i has to bear in case of per capita sharing, we thus
 8 have: $\gamma_i^{PC} = \frac{1}{4}$. In our specific case, each subject has thus to bear a loss of 50 ECUs.

In the Proportional treatment (PR-A), the share of the loss that each subject has to
 bear in case of an accident depends on their relative level of contribution (to reducing the
 probability of the loss occurring). More precisely, the share of the loss for a subject i under
 this sharing rule, denoted γ_i^{PR} , is given by the ratio of their deviation from the maximum
 contribution (19 ECUs) to the sum of the four members' deviations. That is:

$$\gamma_i^{PR}(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l) = \frac{19 - x_i}{4 * 19 - (x_i + x_j + x_k + x_l)} \quad (2)$$

9 If all subjects contribute the same amount to the reduction of probability, the individual
 10 share of loss simplifies to a per capita one. If a subject i decides not to contribute and if
 11 the three others contribute the maximum amount (19 ECUs), subject i bears the entire
 12 loss. If a subject i decides to contribute the maximum amount, their share of the loss is
 13 reduced to 0.

	Anonymous	Identification
PC	PC-A	PC-ID
PR	PR-A	PR-ID

Table 1: Treatments

14 We implement the identification mechanism in the treatments PC-ID and PR-ID.¹⁶ We

¹³Note that the possibility of reaching a zero probability when all the four agents make a maximum contribution of 19 has no impact on the equilibrium values of contribution (see later). Moreover, in the data, we can see that the perspective of escaping risk has not been seen as an attractive one (see Table 3 below).

¹⁴To avoid the subjects needing mathematical skills in order to understand the function of probability, they were not given the functional form of that function but a table of all probabilities instead. See the instructions in Appendix A.1.

¹⁵A stands for *anonymous*.

¹⁶ID stands for *information disclosure*.

1 replicate the two sharing rules and, in addition, subjects can be publicly identified for their
2 contributions. We follow Andreoni and Petrie (2004) and Samek and Sheremeta (2014)
3 and use digital photos and first names to identify individuals to one another.¹⁷ While
4 these previous studies opted to display information on group members in each period of
5 the game, we opted for a different strategy. First, in the instructions, subjects are told that
6 at the end of the experiment, the picture and the first name of the five worst contributors,
7 characterized by the lowest average contributions over four randomly selected periods,
8 will be displayed on the computer screens of all participants. This random draw of four
9 periods implies that a given subject may potentially be identified even in the absence of an
10 accident. Indeed, in practice, information disclosure works on the basis of random audits
11 which are totally independent of any damage caused or pollution emissions. This differs
12 from legal inquiries which are conducted *ex post*, once the damage has happened. Thus the
13 identification mechanism operates *ex ante*, irrespective of the occurrence of damage and
14 allows us to avoid path-dependency. If a subject were possibly identified only in case of an
15 accident, then a subject making a low investment only once might be identified while a
16 subject making zero investment except once might not be. This also makes over-investment
17 in the periods following an accident less likely. Second, since our goal is to work on the
18 subjects' sensitivity to social pressures (or stigmatization), we show the picture and the
19 name of the five subjects who contribute the least among all the participants of the session
20 whether or not they have been in the same group.

21 In each treatment, subjects make the same decision, i.e., choosing how much they want
22 to contribute to decreasing the probability of a loss. In addition, they are also requested
23 in every period (in addition to the contribution decisions) to indicate their beliefs about
24 the average contribution of the three other members of their group. They are rewarded
25 according to the accuracy of their beliefs.¹⁸ The goal is to elicit individual beliefs about
26 others' behavior, since these beliefs have been shown to be important drivers of individ-
27 ual decision, in particular in public goods environments (Croson, 2007; Fischbacher and
28 Gächter, 2010). Their gains for each period depend on whether or not the loss occurred.

¹⁷As pointed out by Samek and Sheremeta (2014), photos capture and preserve the appearance of the person but do not allow for communication, which may confound the effects of identification alone. In addition to the photo, we therefore included first names.

¹⁸We follow Gächter and Renner (2010) for belief elicitation. Subjects earned 6 ECUs if they correctly (± 0.5 ECUs) predicted the average contribution of the three other members and 3 ECUs divided by the (absolute) estimation error otherwise.

1 If there was no loss, subjects obtain their endowment of 19 ECUs minus their investment
 2 in reducing the probability. In case of a loss, they get their endowment of 19 ECUs mi-
 3 nus their investment in reducing the probability and their share of the loss which differs
 4 according to the liability rule. At the end of each period, subjects are informed about the
 5 total contribution of their group, the resulting probability, the occurrence of the loss and
 6 their own payoffs. This allows for individual learning and thus enhances the understanding
 7 of the game. Notice that a period was randomly drawn for payment (see subsection 3.1
 8 below).

9 In addition to the main game, we also elicit participants' risk attitude using the method
 10 developed by Eckel and Grossman (2002). Participants are presented with 5 different
 11 gambles and have to select only one of them. Each gamble offers a 50% chance of getting
 12 the low payoff and a 50% chance of getting the high payoff. Gamble 1 is a certain gamble
 13 (no risk) while Gamble 5 is the riskiest gamble (highest expected return but also highest
 14 standard deviation). Highly risk-averse subjects are expected to choose gambles with the
 15 lowest standard deviations.

16 2.2 Model and predictions

17 We build here a simple model, which is based on the design introduced above. The aim is
 18 to derive some predictions to be tested in the experiment.

19 We consider a group of four symmetric risk-neutral agents. We note W their initial en-
 20 dowments, and H the loss that they can cause altogether to a passive third party (e.g.,
 21 the environment). x_i is the contribution that an agent i can make in order to reduce the
 22 probability of causing the loss H , with $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$. Any positive contribution is costly,
 23 through a decrease in the additional endowment $R(x_i)$ (with $\frac{\partial R(x_i)}{\partial x_i} < 0$).

Recall that (strict) liability always applies in case of loss occurring. This means that the
 group, as a whole, always pays for the entire loss that it causes to the passive third party.
 The loss is entirely repaired by the group, but how this payment is shared between the
 four agents of the group depends on the sharing rule r which applies ($r = PC, PR$). We
 note γ_i^r the share of the loss an agent i has to bear under a rule r . We have $\gamma_i^{PC} = \frac{1}{4}$
 in case of a per capita rule, and $\gamma_i^{PR} = \gamma_i(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)$, as defined by (2), in case of a
 proportional rule. As a result, the agent i 's expected payoff depending on the sharing rule

r is:

$$E[\Pi_i^r(x_i)] = W + R(x_i) - \gamma_i^r p(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)H$$

1 with $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$, $j = 1, 2, 3, 4$, $k = 1, 2, 3, 4$, $l = 1, 2, 3, 4$, $i \neq j \neq k \neq l$.

2

Moreover, we suppose that each agent may receive an additional benefit from (or may incur an additional cost from) Society. Here, Society refers to any party who can observe and make a value judgment on the actions made by an agent. It can be the other group members, or even an external party who only observes any public information which is disclosed. The benefit, or the cost, that an agent may receive from Society relates to the others' perception of the agent's ability to be concerned about the consequences of their action (through their contribution in causing a loss). For an agent who is an individual, it refers to the perception of their social image by others.¹⁹ In accordance with our experimental design, which fits with decisions made by individuals or SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises), we will talk about the social image of agents.²⁰ We note the social image as e , and the agent's sensitivity to this image as β_i ($\beta_i \geq 0$). As a result, an agent i 's utility is:

$$u_i = E[\Pi_i^r(x_i)] + \beta_i e \tag{3}$$

3 e can be seen as a coefficient of one's social image: $e > 0$ means that others have a positive
4 social image of the agent i , $e < 0$ means a negative social image. The higher the absolute
5 value of e , the stronger the social image. Overall, a negative value of e associated with
6 a strictly positive value of β_i may stand for *shame*, a feeling which has been analyzed in
7 the literature (see notably Lopez-Perez, 2010 for a theoretical analysis and Tadelis, 2011

¹⁹The model could fit with monetary gains/losses, due to a variation in the firm's brand image or reputation. However, our experimental design does not include the possibility for other pecuniary losses other than those due to liability in case of a loss occurring.

²⁰Many SMEs are managed by owner-managers, who have at least a personal responsibility for the decisions they make for their company. They are personally identified, and are personally impacted by what happens to their company. Decisions are thus closed to those which are made for an individual purpose. As an illustration, Afsah et al., 1996 show that firms are sensitive to the opinion of local communities. We can note that SMEs, like larger firms, may also be subject to reputational monetary gains or losses, which are not captured by our experiment. As a consequence, the impact of this additional benefit/cost on SMEs could be higher than the one we measure in this experiment.

1 for an experiment with a trust game).²¹ Depending on the value of β_i , the agent can be
2 sensitive to a policy of information disclosure that has an impact on her social image
3 (when $\beta_i > 0$), or not sensitive to it (when $\beta_i = 0$). In the latter case, the agent acts as a
4 *homo oeconomicus*.

5 Depending on the sharing rule r and the value of β_i , we can now provide a theoretical
6 basis for the four treatments defined above (see Table 1). When $\beta_i = 0$, the agent acts
7 as a *homo oeconomicus*, with or without an identification mechanism.²² $\beta_i > 0$ captures
8 the cases where both an identification mechanism is in place, and the agent is sensitive to
9 their social image. Given our specifications, we can complete Table 1 as follows:

	Anonymous	Identification
PC	PC-A $\gamma_i^{PC} = 1/4$ $\beta_i = 0$	PC-ID $\gamma_i^{PC} = 1/4$ $\beta_i > 0$
PR	PR-A γ_i^{PR} $\beta_i = 0$	PR-ID γ_i^{PR} $\beta_i > 0$

Table 2: Treatments and parameters

10 2.2.1 Per capita sharing rule (PC) when agents are not sensitive to their 11 social image ($\beta_i = 0$)

Perfect symmetry between agents implies equal contributions in equilibrium. Below, we introduce the best response of a given agent i to the contributions of the three other

²¹Deffains and Fluet (2013) use the word (dis)esteem which holds through the others' view of the agent's ability to care about, and to contribute in reducing, the expected common loss. This agent's concern about the loss could be included in the model, through an additional cost in (3) such as: $-p(x_i)\theta H$, with θ the degree of the agent's concern for the loss (with $\theta \geq 0$). (Dis)esteem is based on the underlying rationale that others cannot observe θ , but they try to infer its value, especially through the information disclosed by the identification mechanism. So, esteem (resp. disesteem) plays a role when others think that we have a high (resp. low) value of θ . Hence, θ is only an instrumental variable, and to ease the exposition we choose not to introduce it.

²²For simplicity, we only consider the case where no identification mechanism holds. However, we have to note that $\beta_i = 0$ also captures the case where an identification mechanism holds but the agent is not sensitive to their social image. But it is not of particular relevance to distinguish these two cases for our analysis.

agents. The utility of an agent i , who is a *homo oeconomicus* under a per capita rule is:

$$u_i = E[\Pi_i^{PC}(x_i)] = W + R(x_i) - \frac{1}{4}p(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)H \quad (4)$$

The equilibrium value $x_i^{PC}(x_j, x_k, x_l) = x_i^{PC}$ thus satisfies:

$$\frac{\partial E[\Pi_i^{PC}(x_i)]}{\partial x_i} = 0 \Leftrightarrow -\frac{\partial p(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)}{\partial x_i} \frac{H}{4} = -\frac{\partial R(x_i)}{\partial x_i} \quad (5)$$

1 We now turn to the private decision-making of a *homo oeconomicus* under a proportional
2 rule.

3 **2.2.2 Proportional sharing rule (PR) when agents are not sensitive to their** 4 **social image ($\beta_i = 0$)**

Again, perfect symmetry implies equal contributions at equilibrium. The utility of an agent
 i is:

$$u_i = E[\Pi_i^{PR}(x_i)] = W + R(x_i) - \gamma_i^{PR}(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)p(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)H \quad (6)$$

The equilibrium value $x_i^{PR}(x_j, x_k, x_l) = x_i^{PR}$ satisfies:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial E[\Pi_i^{PR}(x_i)]}{\partial x_i} &= 0 \\ \Leftrightarrow -\left[\frac{\partial \gamma_i^{PR}(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)}{\partial x_i} \cdot p(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l) + \frac{\partial p(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)}{\partial x_i} \cdot \gamma_i^{PR}(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l) \right] H &= -\frac{\partial R(x_i)}{\partial x_i} \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

5 **2.2.3 Comparison of sharing rules when agents are not sensitive to their social** 6 **image ($\beta_i = 0$)**

7 We compare incentives to contribute between the two sharing rules, *PC* and *PR*, for
8 a *homo oeconomicus* agent ($\beta_i = 0$). When comparing (7) with (5), we can see that
9 both marginal costs of contributing are equal, but the marginal benefits are different. In
10 Appendix A.2, we show that for a level of contribution which is equal to the equilibrium
11 contribution under the PC rule (i.e., $x_i = x_i^{PC}$), the marginal benefit of contributing is
12 higher under the PR rule than under the PC rule. This is due to a double marginal benefit

1 of contributing under the PR rule, which allows both the reduction of the probability of
 2 an accident and the share of the cost to be paid (all other things being equal). Given the
 3 functional forms and the values of the parameters, the equilibrium investments satisfying
 4 (5) and (7) are respectively 2.74 and 4.84. This leads to the following prediction.

5 **Prediction 1.** *In a symmetric setting, the proportional sharing rule leads to higher con-*
 6 *tributions than the per capita rule, when agents are not sensitive to their social image*
 7 *($\beta_i = 0$).*

8 In the next subsections, we study whether (and to what extent) contributions differ when
 9 agents are sensitive to their social image.

10 **2.2.4 Per capita sharing rule (PC) when agents are sensitive to their social** 11 **image ($\beta_i > 0$)**

12 The fact of being identified as a low contributor provides Society with information. From
 13 this information, Society infers the extent to which the identified agent cares about the
 14 loss borne by others.

15 The utility of an agent i , who is sensitive to their social image, under a per capita rule is
 16 given by (3) with $r = PC$. Before the disclosure of any information via the identification
 17 mechanism, others have a *prior* image (of the agent) which is denoted by \bar{e} . In the case
 18 where the agent is identified as a low contributor, this social image is deteriorated, to
 19 the extent that not contributing in reducing a public bad is stigmatized by Society. So,
 20 being identified as a low contributor is a “bad news”, which leads to an update e_B of
 21 the social image, with $e_B < \bar{e}$ (the subscript B denoting the bad news), given the rule
 22 r . In the opposite case where the agent is not identified as a low contributor, a “good
 23 news” is diffused, since there is a signal that the agent belongs to the group of the better
 24 contributors. The social image sees a gain, and so there is an update e_G , with $e_G > \bar{e}$ (the
 25 superscript G denoting the good news).

Denoting by $q^r(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)$ the probability of being identified as a low contributor, given a
 contribution x_i and contributions x_j, x_k, x_l of the others, and a rule r (with $\frac{\partial q^r(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)}{\partial x_i} <$
 0), the *ex ante* utility for an agent being sensitive to their social image under a per capita

rule is:

$$\begin{aligned}
u_i &= E[\Pi_i^{PC}(x_i)] + \beta_i \left[q^{PC}(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l) e_B^{PC} + (1 - q^{PC}(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)) e_G^{PC} \right] \\
\Rightarrow u_i &= E[\Pi_i^{PC}(x_i)] + \beta_i \left[e_G^{PC} - q^{PC}(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l) \Delta^{PC} \right]
\end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

1 with $\Delta^{PC} = e_G^{PC} - e_B^{PC}$

2 **2.2.5 Proportional sharing rule (PR) when agents are sensitive to their social**
3 **image ($\beta_i > 0$)**

When a proportional sharing rule (with identification mechanism) is enforced, the *ex ante* utility of an agent i who is sensitive to their social image is:

$$\begin{aligned}
u_i &= E[\Pi_i^{PR}(x_i)] + \beta_i \left[q^{PR}(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l) e_B^{PR} + (1 - q^{PR}(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)) e_G^{PR} \right] \\
\Rightarrow u_i &= E[\Pi_i^{PR}(x_i)] + \beta_i \left[e_G^{PR} - q^{PR}(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l) \Delta^{PR} \right]
\end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

4 with $\Delta^{PR} = e_G^{PR} - e_B^{PR}$

5

6 When we compare (4) with (8), and (6) with (9), we can deduce that the sensitivity to one's
7 social image provides additional incentives to contribute since, whatever the sharing rule,
8 an increase in the level of contribution increases the probability of not being identified as
9 a low contributor, and thus benefiting from a favorable update (or avoiding a detrimental
10 update) of one's social image (i.e., $\frac{\partial [e_G^{PR} - q^{PR}(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l) \Delta^{PR}]}{\partial x_i} > 0$). The following prediction
11 can be made.

12 **Prediction 2.** *The identification mechanism should raise the contribution levels chosen*
13 *by each player, whatever the liability sharing rule: the contribution levels should thus be*
14 *higher under PC-ID (resp. PR-ID) than under PC-A (PR-A).*

15

2.2.6 Comparison of sharing rules when agents are sensitive to their social image ($\beta_i > 0$)

The ID mechanism provides additional incentives to contribute, for a given rule. However, the incentives provided by this mechanism are different between rules. The social image perceived by Society is the opinion (or belief) that others have towards oneself, in general or as regards a given personal quality. In our analysis, the social image holds on the agent's ability to care about, and to contribute in reducing, the expected common loss. However, the informational content of being recognized as a low contributor, or not, is different depending on which sharing rule applies.

In case of a proportional sharing rule, a decrease in the agent's contribution leads to an increase in their share of liability (and a decrease in the others' shares). As a consequence, the negative externality which follows from lowering their contribution (via the increase in the probability of causing the common loss) is somewhat mitigated by the increase in their share in the payment for the loss: the low contribution is "punished" by a higher share of liability, in a rationale close to a "polluter-pays" principle. The agent thus takes responsibility for their (detrimental) action. This rationale does not work under a per capita rule, which leaves room for more free-riding: the negative externality which comes from a low contribution is not balanced by a higher participation in the payment of the loss. A given decrease in contribution x_i thus leads to a higher increase in the expected loss for other group members. Finally, because the proportional rule provides higher pecuniary incentives to contribute than the per capita rule, not being recognized as a low contributor under the proportional rule may provide less merit than under per capita rule.

As a consequence of all these effects, under the PC rule, being identified as a low contributor provides a clear signal of being little concerned by the consequences of the loss, while the signal is more "blurred" under the PR rule since a low contributor pays for a larger share of the loss. It follows that: $\Delta^{PR} < \Delta^{PC}$. Then, for similar probabilities of being identified as a low contributor between the sharing rules (i.e., $q^{PC}(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l) = q^{PR}(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)$), we obtain the following prediction.²³

²³From a formal point of view, this Prediction is obtained from the comparison between Equations (4) and (8) on the one hand, and Equations (6) and (9) on the other hand. From the former comparison, we can deduce the impact of social image on the incentives to contribute in case of per capita sharing. From the later comparison, we can deduce the impact in case of proportional sharing. In both cases, the additional incentives (provided by the identification mechanism) depend on β_i , $q^r(\cdot)$, and Δ^r . As a result,

1 **Prediction 3.** *Incentives to contribute provided by the identification mechanism should*
2 *be higher under a per capita rule than under a proportional rule.*

3 **Results**

4 **3.1 Procedure**

5 A total of 240 subjects participated in 12 sessions (3 sessions per treatment) in Octo-
6 ber 2019 and in March 2020 at the Laboratory of Experimental Economics in Strasbourg
7 (LEES). The subjects were recruited from a list of experimental subjects maintained at
8 the LEES using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2015). The experiment was computerized.
9 Upon arrival, each subject was randomly assigned to a computer. The instructions were
10 read aloud by the experimenter and, before starting, a comprehension questionnaire was
11 administered to check that the rules were well understood. All questions were answered
12 privately. Then the main game took place, followed by the elicitation of risk preferences
13 and finally a post-experimental questionnaire (see Appendix A.1). At the end of the ex-
14 periment, one period from the main game was drawn randomly for actual payment. A
15 random draw was also made to pick the payoff earned by subjects in the risk elicitation
16 task. The conversion rate was 20 ECUs to 1.5 € for the main game and 4 ECUs to 1 €
17 for the risk aversion elicitation task. Subjects were paid their earnings in a separate room
18 and privately at the end of the session. Average earnings were 19.95 € (std. dev. = 3.04).
19 The experiment lasted 60 minutes on average.

20 In the treatments PC-ID and PR-ID, we display digital photos of low contributors. Upon
21 arriving in the lab, a digital photograph of each participant was taken by the experimenter.
22 They gave their consent to the use of the picture during the experiment and they were
23 told that all pictures would be deleted at the end of the experiment. They were free to
24 stay to attend the deletion. At the beginning of the experiment, participants also had to
25 enter their first name on the screen so that it could be associated with their picture.

26 In the following subsections, we present the results in two steps. First, we look at the
27 average contributions to decreasing the probability of a loss and perform a series of non-
28 parametric tests. Second, we examine the individual choices to contribute in order to

for β_i and $q^r(\cdot)$ given, $\Delta^{PC} > \Delta^{PR}$ leads to Prediction 3. But this can only be a conjecture, which we justify by the above argumentation.

Treatment	Average contribution	% of contributions = 0	% of contributions = endowment
PC-A	7.27 (4.24)	7.75% (26.75)	4% (19.60)
PC-ID	9.03 (5.62)	7.25% (25.94)	13.33% (34.01)
PR-A	9.91 (5.10)	3.92% (19.41)	9.58% (29.45)
PR-ID	11.30 (5.25)	2% (14.01)	16.33% (36.98)

Table 3: Mean, minimum, and maximum contributions per treatment (std. dev. in parentheses)

1 identify the effects of the treatments on subjects' behavior.

2 **3.2 Average contributions**

3 Table 3 presents the average contributions (and standard deviations) as well as the propor-
4 tions of minimum (0 ECU) and maximum (19 ECUs) contributions in each treatment. On
5 average, contributions are higher in the Proportional treatments than in the Per Capita
6 treatments (PR-A and PR-ID compared respectively with PC-A and PC-ID). Among the
7 four treatments, subjects contribute the most in PR-ID. When anonymity is fully pre-
8 served in the Proportional treatment (PR-A), average contributions are lower but still
9 higher than in the Per Capita treatment (PC-A) that displays the lowest level of contri-
10 butions. In both Proportional and Per Capita treatments, when information disclosure is
11 introduced, average contributions increase.

12 We first test for the effect of the liability rule and look at the differences between PC-
13 A and PR-A wherein subjects are fully anonymous.²⁴ The way of apportioning liability
14 appears to affect the contribution levels since the average contribution rises from 7.27 in
15 PC-A to 9.91 in PR-A, and this increase is significantly different from zero ($p = 0.0003$). It
16 also significantly increases the proportion of maximum contributions, from 4% in PC-A to
17 9.58% in PR-A (test of proportion, $p = 0.0000$), and decreases the percentage of minimum
18 contributions from 7.75% in PC-A to 3.92% in PR-A (test of proportion, $p = 0.0001$).

19 The same conclusion applies when contributors can be identified. Here, the average con-
20 tribution increases from 9.03 in PC-ID to 11.30 in PR-ID ($p = 0.0089$) and the percentage
21 of maximum contributions goes up from 13.33% in the PC-ID treatment to 16.33% in

²⁴Unless specifically noted, we report the significance levels of a two-sided Mann-Whitney rank-sum test taking individual averages as the unit of observation. Given the sample size of 60 subjects per treatment and the averages and standard deviations presented in Table 3, we must acknowledge that the statistical power of two samples comparisons can be low and is around 57% depending on the test.

1 the PR-ID treatment. This rise is significant (test of proportion, $p = 0.0387$), albeit to
2 a lesser extent than in the treatments where contributors cannot be identified. It seems
3 that the impact of the liability rule is mitigated by the effect of identification. The per-
4 centage of minimum contributions falls from from 7.25% in PC-ID to 2% in PR-ID (test
5 of proportion, $p = 0.0000$).

6 In addition to looking at the percentage of maximum and minimum contributions, we can
7 compare the distributions of contributions²⁵ and determine whether the proportional rule
8 modifies the shape of the distributions. In both cases, either with and without anonymity, a
9 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test allows us to reject the null hypothesis of equality of distributions.
10 There is a significant difference between the PC-A and PR-A treatments ($p = 0.001$), as
11 well as between the PC-ID and PR-ID treatments ($p = 0.009$).

12 This supports Prediction 1 according to which the proportional sharing rule leads to higher
13 investments than the per capita rule.

14

15 **Result 1: Contributions to reduce the probability of damage are higher under**
16 **a proportional rule of liability than under a per capita rule.**

17

18 In order to identify the effect of identification, we now compare treatments for a given
19 liability rule. That is, we look at differences between PC-A and PC-ID and between PR-
20 A and PR-ID. As shown in Table 3, in the Per Capita treatments, when contributors
21 can be identified, it significantly increases the average level of contributions. The average
22 contribution goes from 7.27 in PC-A to 9.03 in PC-ID ($p = 0.0384$). In the Proportional
23 treatments, allowing for the identification of the worst contributors has a positive impact
24 on the average level of contributions too. The average contribution increases from 9.91 in
25 PR-A to 11.30 in PR-ID but the difference is not statistically significant ($p = 0.1076$). This
26 finding is consistent with Prediction 2 regarding the PC rule, but contradicts the prediction
27 regarding the PR rule. As a consequence, Prediction 3 is found to be valid, since we find a
28 positive effect of the ID mechanism under a PC rule and no effect of that mechanism under
29 a PR rule. This result can be explained by the fact that when a proportional rule applies,
30 low contributors bear a greater share of liability than high contributors. Therefore, the

²⁵See Appendix A.3 for the distributions of contributions per treatment.

1 externality they impose on others is less important than when a per capita rule applies.
2 The stigmatization is lower in a Proportional treatment since contributors assume their
3 small contributions by paying a higher part of the loss.
4 Regarding the proportions of maximum contributions, we find that identification signifi-
5 cantly increases these proportions in the Per Capita treatments and in the Proportional
6 treatments. The percentage of maximum contributions goes from 4% in PC-A to 13.33%
7 in PC-ID (test of proportion, $p = 0.0000$) and it increases from 9.58% in PR-A to 16.33%
8 in PR-ID (test of proportion, $p = 0.0000$). Interestingly, when we look at the proportions
9 of minimum contributions, we do not find a significant difference between PC-A and PC-
10 ID (test of proportion, $p = 0.6419$). However, the percentage of free-riding significantly
11 decreases, from 3.92% in PR-A to 2% in PR-ID (test of proportion, $p = 0.0056$). When we
12 perform a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we find a significant difference between the total dis-
13 tributions of PC-A and PC-ID and no difference between those of PR-A and PR-ID. Thus,
14 identification modifies the distribution in the Per Capita treatments (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
15 test, $p = 0.016$) while it does not in the Proportional treatments (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
16 test, $p = 0.378$).

17

18 **Result 2: Recognizing the lowest contributors significantly increases contribu-**
19 **tions under a per capita rule of liability but does not increase contributions**
20 **under a proportional rule.**

21

22 Figure 1 illustrates the average contributions per period in each of the four treatments.
23 The declining trend we observe is a stylized fact that is consistent with multiple rounds
24 public goods games where contributions tend to decline as the game is repeated (Andreoni
25 and Petrie, 2004). It is also clear from Figure 1 that PC-A is the least efficient treatment
26 in terms of maintaining high contributions while PR-ID seems to be the most efficient.
27 Also, in PR-ID, the decay of contributions is considerably reduced compared to other
28 treatments. Interestingly, the curves for PC-ID and PR-A are rather close and there is no
29 significant difference between these two treatments ($p = 0.2635$). This would suggest that
30 it is equally effective, all else being equal, to implement a procedure of identification of
31 low contributors with a per capita rule or to use a proportional rule alone. This result is

1 interesting, especially for public policy. When it is difficult to identify the precise degree of
2 liability of a firm (or when the legal framework does not allow the use of proportionality),
3 a per capita rule where only the worst contributors need to be identified publicly, might
4 prove to be as efficient a solution as a proportional rule. We will discuss this result further
5 in the conclusion.

6

7 **Result 3: A per capita rule combined with an identification mechanism makes**
8 **it possible to reach the same level of contribution as a proportional rule alone.**

9

10 Figure 1 also shows an increase in contributions in the 6th, 11th, and 16th periods. These
11 surges correspond to the reallocation of groups and display a restart effect. To get rid
12 of these reallocation effects, Figure 2 shows the mean contributions combining the four
13 five-round sequences per treatment. The declining tendency seems to be more pronounced
14 in the treatments without identification. In PC-A the mean contribution starts at 7.96 and
15 ends at 6.39, and in PR-A it goes from 10.68 to 9.33. The level of mean contributions looks
16 more stable when anonymity is broken. In PC-ID, the mean contribution begins at 9.53
17 and decreases to 8.65. The effect of repetition seems even less important in PR-ID (11.52
18 to 10.95). This means that the threat of being exposed may prevent contributions from
19 declining over time as much as when liability applies alone. The comparisons of the treat-
20 ments with and without anonymity indicate that there is a significant difference between
21 PC-A and PC-ID ($p = 0.0372$) and between PC-A and PR-ID ($p = 0.0669$).²⁶ However,
22 the difference between PR-A and PR-ID is not statistically significant ($p = 0.1657$) nor is
23 it between PC-ID and PR-A ($p = 0.1050$).

24

25 **Result 4: The identification of low contributors reduces the decay of contribu-**
26 **tions compared to situations in which anonymity is guaranteed.**

27

²⁶The p-value is based on the difference between the average contribution of the first four periods in each group and the average contribution of the last four periods in each group by individuals.




Figure 1: Average contributions over time per treatment




Figure 2: Mean contributions combining all 5-period sequences

1 3.3 Individual decisions

2 We now turn to the analysis of individual contributions in order to explain the differences
 3 between treatments. We first estimate a Tobit model with random effects since our depen-
 4 dent variable (the level of contribution) is left-censored at 0 and right-censored at 19.²⁷
 5 Table 4 presents the different variables that are used in the regressions and the results are

²⁷All results are robust to the use of other specifications such as OLS or individual clustered standard errors and whether or not socio-demographic variables are included.

1 displayed in Table 5. In specification (1), the analysis is based on the pooled data over the
2 four treatments. We identify the treatment effects by using three dummy variables (the
3 baseline being PC-A). In specifications (2) and (3), we focus on the Per Capita treatments
4 and the Proportional treatments separately in order to isolate the effect of identification.
5 In the last two columns, we estimate logit models to identify the drivers of choice to
6 contribute nothing and to contribute the total endowment.

Table 4: Variables definition

Variables	Definition	Mean (std. dev.)
PC-ID	1 if the treatment is PC-ID; 0 otherwise	0.25 (0.43)
PR-A	1 if the treatment is PR-A; 0 otherwise	0.25 (0.43)
PR-ID	1 if the treatment is PR-ID; 0 otherwise	0.25 (0.43)
Loss _{<i>p</i>-1}	1 if a loss occurred in the previous period; 0 otherwise	0.14 (0.34)
AveragePartners _{<i>p</i>-1}	Average contribution of the 3 other group members in the previous period	9.43 (3.82)
Period	1 in period 1, 2 in period 2, ... , 20 in period 20	10.50 (5.77)
<u>Socio-demographic variables</u>		
Gamble	1 if subject chooses Gamble 1, ... , 5 if subject chooses Gamble 5	3.47 (1.35)
Risk-seeking	Answer from an 11-point Likert scale: 0 standing for a careful person and 10 for a person who loves taking risks	5.37 (2.09)
Female	1 if subject is female; 0 otherwise	0.5 (0.5)
Age	Age of subject	21.40 (2.66)
Econ-manag	1 if subject studies economics and management; 0 otherwise	0.54 (0.5)
Distrust	1 if subject states that “We must be very careful with people”; 0 otherwise	0.73 (0.45)
Earnings	1 if subject states that “They only cared about their own payoff during the game”; 0 otherwise	0.45 (0.5)

7 We see from column (1) in Table 5 that all the coefficients of the treatment variables
8 are positive and statistically significant. The contributions are higher in PC-ID, PR-A,
9 and PR-ID than in PC-A, but the highest difference in magnitude is found for PR-ID
10 which is the most efficient treatment to increase contributions. A t-test of equality of the
11 coefficients of PC-ID and PR-ID indicates that they are significantly different ($p = 0.022$).
12 However, there is no significant difference between the coefficients of PR-A and PR-ID (p

1 = 0.118) nor between those of PC-ID and PR-A ($p = 0.474$). This furthermore supports
2 Results 1, 2 and 3 obtained with the non-parametric tests.

3 Among other results, the occurrence of a loss in the previous period increases the contribu-
4 tions. This can be explained by the availability heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973).
5 Subjects recall the loss in the previous period perfectly and, therefore, tend to overstate
6 the probability of a loss in the current period. It also supports the reinforcement effect
7 for losses attributed to Thaler and Johnson (1990). This means that decision makers will
8 act more cautiously after experiencing losses. In our case, subjects invest more in reducing
9 the probability of a loss if it happened in the previous period. While empirical results are
10 mixed, Nielsen (2019) also finds support for the reinforcement effect. The effect of the
11 average contribution of the other group members in the previous period²⁸ is positive and
12 highly significant. This means that the higher the average contribution of the other group
13 members in the previous period, the more subjects are willing to contribute. As shown in
14 Figure 1, the effect of periods is negative, which indicates that contributions decrease over
15 time. In the first column of Table A.1 in Appendix A.4, we also present a regression in
16 which we introduce a dummy variable for each period of group reallocation (i.e., the 6th,
17 11th, and 16th periods) and we find significant and positive reallocation effects suggesting
18 some restart effects.

19 In the second model in Table 5, we focus solely on the Per Capita treatments to get rid
20 of the effect of the liability rules. The effect of identification appears to be statistically
21 significant ($p = 0.027$), which means that when anonymity is broken in the Per Capita
22 treatments, contributions are higher on average than when it is preserved. Like in regres-
23 sion (1), the occurrence of a loss and higher contributions from the other group members
24 in the previous period increase the individual contributions. The coefficient of *Period* is
25 also negative and highly significant. However, while Figure 2 seemed to indicate that iden-
26 tification prevented contributions from declining over time as much as when anonymity
27 was preserved, we do not find econometric evidence of this trend. Indeed, in regression (2)
28 of Table A.1 in Appendix A.4, we introduce an interaction variable for *Period* and PC-ID
29 and it appears not to be statistically significant. This contradicts Result 4 based on the

²⁸We used this lagged variable rather than the subject's belief about the average contribution of the other group members since we obtain the same results no matter which variable is employed, but the effects are more statistically significant with the former.

Table 5: Tobit and logit estimations

	All	PC	PR	Free-riding	Full contrib.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
PC-ID	2.001** (1.012)	2.073** (0.939)		-.022 (0.024)	0.048** (0.022)
PR-A	2.727*** (1.015)			-.032 (0.023)	0.045** (0.022)
PR-ID	4.313*** (1.021)		1.695* (1.024)	-.051** (0.022)	0.061** (0.024)
Loss _{p-1}	0.512*** (0.131)	0.598*** (0.161)	0.417** (0.208)	-.012* (0.007)	0.014* (0.007)
AveragePartners _{p-1}	0.277*** (0.02)	0.31*** (0.026)	0.244*** (0.03)	-.000 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Period	-.071*** (0.008)	-.077*** (0.01)	-.064*** (0.013)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)
Gamble	-.369 (0.288)	-.255 (0.369)	-.254 (0.427)	0.017*** (0.006)	-.008 (0.007)
Risk-seeking	-.451** (0.187)	-.327 (0.243)	-.712*** (0.276)	0.002 (0.004)	-.011*** (0.004)
Female	-2.238*** (0.779)	-1.452 (0.984)	-2.639** (1.147)	-.005 (0.016)	-.084*** (0.015)
Age	0.13 (0.145)	0.064 (0.179)	0.137 (0.222)	0.005** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)
Econ-manag	-.962 (0.782)	-2.907*** (0.998)	1.058 (1.137)	0.015 (0.016)	-.018 (0.019)
Distrust	0.887 (0.809)	2.307** (1.079)	-.767 (1.132)	-.02 (0.016)	0.004 (0.019)
Earnings	-.449 (0.731)	-2.589*** (0.979)	1.728* (1.021)	0.051*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.017)
Constant	7.613** (3.757)	8.142* (4.520)	10.668* (5.873)		
Obs.	4560	2280	2280	4560	4560
Left-censored obs.	245	177	68	/	/
Right-censored obs.	487	194	293	/	/

Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Average marginal effects are reported in models (4) and (5).

1 non-parametric tests. Regarding the socio-economic variables, we find that subjects who
2 study economics and management contribute less when faced with per capita incentives.
3 It is likely that they have covered this topic in class, so that they might be aware that
4 the optimal strategy is to deviate. Also, when subjects are wary of people, they tend to
5 contribute more. They may expect low contributions from the other group members so
6 they invest more to compensate for that. In these treatments, subjects have an incentive to
7 free-ride in order to maximize their payoff. This could explain the negative and significant
8 coefficient of *Earnings*.

9 The third regression of Table 5 focuses on the Proportional treatments only. As expected
10 from the non-parametric tests, the identification of low contributors does not affect the
11 level of contributions, as evidenced by the coefficient of PR-ID which is not statistically
12 significant ($p = 0.098$). The effects of the occurrence of a loss, the contributions of others,
13 and time are the same as in the previous regressions. Breaking anonymity still has no effect
14 on the decline of contributions over time, as shown by the coefficient of the interaction
15 variable of *Period* and PR-ID which is not statistically significant.²⁹ It is still not in line
16 with Result 4 derived from the non-parametric tests. If we look at the socio-economic
17 variables, we observe that the coefficient of *Risk-seeking* is negative and significant. This
18 variable is a measure of subjects' self-assessed risk propensity, elicited through a question
19 close to the one in Bernasconi et al. (2014) (see the question in Appendix A.1). This means
20 that subjects who self-identify as risk-seeking persons contribute less. By doing so, they
21 increase both the probability of incurring a loss and their share of liability. There is a
22 gender effect as shown by the negative and significant coefficient of *Female*. It seems that
23 women tend to contribute less on average, which is consistent, e.g., with Brown-Kruse and
24 Hummels (1993), who showed that males tend to contribute more than females in public
25 goods games.

26 In the last two columns, we estimate a random-effect Logit model to explain the decision
27 to contribute zero ECU or to contribute the total amount of the endowment. In regression
28 (4), the dependent variable equals one when subjects contributed 0 ECU to decreasing the
29 probability and zero otherwise. In regression (5), the dependent variable is equal to one if
30 subjects contributed their 19 ECUs and zero otherwise. Focusing first on regression (4),

²⁹See column (3) of Table A.1 in Appendix A.4.

1 it turns out that PR-ID is the only treatment that makes free-riding less likely compared
2 to PC-A. In other words, identification does not suffice to reduce the chances of free-
3 riding when a per capita rule applies nor does the proportional rule when anonymity of
4 contributors is preserved. However, a t-test of equality of the coefficients of PR-A and
5 PR-ID indicates that they are not significantly different ($p = 0.296$). This means that
6 with a proportional rule, identifying low contributors does not reduce the probability
7 of contributing nothing. The occurrence of a loss in the previous period diminishes the
8 probability of free-riding, although the effect is marginally significant. Subjects may want
9 to avoid incurring a loss again and they are therefore less willing to free-ride. The effect of
10 time is positive as pointed out by the positive and significant coefficient of *Period*. This is
11 in line with contributions declining over time. As time goes by, subjects may be tempted
12 to contribute nothing to decrease the probability of a loss. The coefficient of *Gamble*³⁰ is
13 positive and highly significant, meaning that subjects who chose the riskiest gambles have
14 more chances of free-riding. Subjects who tried to maximize their earnings are also more
15 likely to contribute nothing since it allows them to increase their own payoff by 19 ECUs
16 if no loss occurs.

17 Finally, when looking at the probability of contributing 19 ECUs, we see that the coeffi-
18 cients of the three treatment variables are positive and significant, which indicates that the
19 probability is higher in all of these treatments than in PC-A. Nevertheless, the coefficients
20 of PR-A and PR-ID are not statistically different, as shown by the t-test of equality of the
21 coefficients ($p = 0.560$). Therefore, when a proportional rule applies, breaking anonymity
22 has no effect on the likelihood of contributing the total endowment. The occurrence of
23 a loss in the previous period affects the probability of contributing 19 ECUs positively,
24 although this effect is only marginally significant. Subjects refer to past decisions of the
25 other group members to make their own. If the other members contributed more in the
26 previous period then it is more likely that subjects will contribute the maximum amount
27 of ECUs. Subjects who stated that they love taking risks show less likelihood of contribut-
28 ing 19 ECUs. There is a strong gender effect, which tells us that women are less likely to
29 contribute their entire endowment. This could explain the gender effect we found in the

³⁰Note that we used two different variables to account for subjects' preferences toward risk (i.e., *Risk-seeking* and *Gamble*). There is no problem of correlation between these two variables as is often the case when risk attitudes are measured using different methods (incentivized and non-incentivized elicitations) (Attanasi et al., 2018; Crosetto and Filippin, 2016).

1 third model of Table 5.

2

3 **Result 5: Recognizing the lowest contributors increases the proportion of full-**
4 **contributions when a per capita rule applies.**

5 4 Conclusion

6 In this paper, we report on an experiment conducted in order to analyze the impact of
7 information disclosure on incentives to prevent a damage when several contributors can
8 be held liable if it occurs. Agents decide on their contributions to reduce the probability
9 of harm; in case of occurrence, they share the loss according to the liability sharing rule
10 in force, i.e., per capita versus proportional. In order to identify the impact of information
11 disclosure, we run four treatments, by varying both the presence of an identification mech-
12 anism and the liability rule. Under a per capita rule of apportionment, in case of harm
13 occurring, the damages are split equally between the four players of the group. Under a
14 proportional rule, each player is held liable for the harm in proportion to their (lack of)
15 investment to avoid it.

16 Our theoretical predictions are notably that a proportional rule should, everything else
17 being equal, raise higher investments than a per capita rule, the intuition being that
18 bearing a share of the harm which depends on relative contributions calls off the free-
19 riding implied by a per capita rule. Most importantly, from a theoretical perspective, we
20 also find that information disclosure should raise investments to a higher extent under a
21 PC rule than under a PR rule if agents are sensitive to their social image.

22 Our results confirm our predictions. We find that information disclosure is efficient under
23 a PC rule, leading to a significant increase in contributions, whereas it has no significant
24 impact under a PR rule. Thus, while a PR rule provides higher incentives to contribute
25 to decreasing the level of expected harm than a PC rule, adding an identification mecha-
26 nism to the PC rule makes it as efficient as the PR rule. The higher effectiveness of the
27 identification mechanism under a PC rule can be explained by the different moral cost of
28 non-contribution under the two rules. Indeed, the PR rule provides subjects with higher
29 pecuniary incentives to contribute than the PC rule. As a consequence, there is less merit
30 in contributing (or not being a low contributor) under PR than under PC, and a low con-

1 tribution under PR is “paid” by a higher share of liability, which reduces the free-riding
2 burden on others. Low contribution is thus less stigmatizing under PR than under PC.
3 We believe that the fact that disclosure acts more effectively under a PC rule than under
4 a PR rule is of interest. The first reason is that, in a way, this result contrasts with the
5 existing literature which concludes that information disclosure systematically has a pos-
6 itive impact on firms’ environmental performance (Blackman et al., 2004; García et al.,
7 2007; Benneer and Olmstead, 2008; García et al., 2009; Powers et al., 2011; Huet-Vaughn
8 et al., 2018). A second reason lies in the fact that, although the PR rule is used in some
9 countries, its cost-effectiveness ratio might be questioned, as compared to the PC rule it
10 requires much more information to be collected, and especially information on the best
11 available technologies or practices, in order to evaluate the firms’ deviations with respect
12 to them. Moreover, from a political economy perspective, implementing a per capita ap-
13 portionment of harm could be easier than a proportional one, which could also be seen as a
14 source of uncertainty for firms. In contrast to the PR rule, information disclosure coupled
15 with a PC rule requires less information, as it only needs a ranking of each firm’s practices.
16 Such a mechanism is indeed implemented in countries in which enforcement of regulations
17 is weak.³¹ This is notably achieved in the environmental field by non-governmental or-
18 ganizations and whistleblowers, which thus play a key role here in terms of information
19 search. Adding information disclosure mechanisms in a PC rule legal context could be a
20 cost-effective alternative to implementing a PR rule and this could be facilitated by public
21 as well as private disclosure.

22 This paper is, to our knowledge, the first to investigate the impact of information disclo-
23 sure by considering different legal contexts. But it is only a first step in that direction. We
24 adopt a liability-sharing context, but extensions should consider other contexts in order
25 to determine whether this result may reflect a pattern. In particular, the possibility for
26 victims, or citizens at large, to express disapproval could be introduced into the analy-
27 sis as a push factor for individual contributions to reduce the expected harm. Moreover,
28 introducing citizens into the analysis could also open the door to the possibility of mis-
29 communication by the agents causing the (expected) harm. As shown in Bramoullé and
30 Orset (2018), firms are able to discredit information revealing their supposed detrimental

³¹See the example of Indonesia in Afsah et al. (1996).

1 actions by producing and publicizing scientific evidence which balances it and/or adver-
2 tising the virtues of their activities. Such actions might lessen the incentivizing power of
3 information disclosure mechanisms. Faced with the possibility of making a choice between
4 preventive efforts to reduce the expected harm (as considered in our paper) on the one
5 hand, and miscommunication efforts to reduce stigmatization if a harm does occur on the
6 other, the proportional liability sharing rule could regain some virtues, relative to the per
7 capita rule. It is also relevant here to point to the possibility that firms may attempt to
8 affect public policies through selective information provision and lobbying. All this opens
9 up a wide scope for action on the part of public decision makers to regulate the possibility
10 of miscommunication.

11 Furthermore, we have to make a remark here on the mechanisms we did not investigate
12 in this paper. While we made a deliberate decision to investigate the role of an identifi-
13 cation mechanism in a public bads context, other effective methods for increasing welfare
14 have been proposed by the literature on public goods, and we believe that applying some
15 features of this literature to our legal context might lead to interesting extensions. For
16 instance, Croson et al. (2015) show that a mechanism of exclusion of the worst contrib-
17 utor leads to increasing contributions, and in particular settings allows full contributions
18 to be reached more quickly. This kind of mechanism would be relevant with regard to our
19 research question. We could also introduce tournaments between agents as regards their
20 contribution, as the literature over tournaments shows that schemes which include some
21 competition between group members can outperform other schemes such as target-based
22 ones (see notably Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997).

23 Finally, in this paper we are interested in the contributions that agents will make to reduce
24 the probability of a common harm under different rules. Whereas contributions vary with
25 the rule in place, the extent of contributions is also related to the *acceptability* of these rules,
26 which we have not considered in this article. The literature on the acceptability of policies
27 in different contexts, such as the environment, fighting obesity, or transport policies, shows
28 that the acceptability may vary a great deal between policies, and this difference in terms
29 of acceptance might explain their difference in terms of efficiency (see notably Steg et al.,
30 2011; Maestre-Andres et al., 2019; de Groot and Schuitema, 2012, on the acceptance of
31 environmental policies). In this paper, we did not evaluate the acceptability of each rule,

1 but in order to further explain the mechanisms that may be at work behind the difference in
2 the efficiency of the rules, it would be interesting in future research to assess the (relative)
3 acceptability of these rules.

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1 A Appendix

2 A.1 Instructions

3 Thank you for participating in this experiment on the economics of decision making. In
4 this experiment you will have the opportunity to make money. The amount of your payoff
5 will depend on **your decisions and the decisions of other participants**. Therefore,
6 we ask you to read these instructions carefully since they will help you understand the ex-
7 periment. All your decisions are **anonymous**. You will give your choices to the computer
8 in front of which you are sitting.

9 From now on, communication is no longer permitted. Please switch off your mobile phone
10 as well. If you have a question, raise your hand and an experimenter will come and answer
11 you in private.

12 This experiment comprises 2 parts. You have received the instructions for part 1. Each
13 time you finish a part, you will get the instructions for the next one. All participants have
14 the same instructions.

15 The earnings you can collect by taking part in this experiment are expressed in ECUs
16 (Experimental Currency Units). At the end of each part, your earnings, in ECUs, will be
17 converted in euros according to the conversion rate that applies to the part in question.
18 At the end of the experiment, the gains you will have earned, converted into euros, will
19 be paid to you in cash privately.

20 PART 1

21 For this part, the conversion rate is **1 ECU = 0.075 €**.

22 This first part of the experiment comprises 20 periods. During this part, you and 3 other
23 randomly chosen anonymous participants will form a group of 4 persons. However, this
24 group will not remain the same during these 20 periods. Every 5 periods, you will be ran-
25 domly reallocated to a new group of 4 persons. It is possible that, within this new group,
26 you may interact with participants you have already played with (in a previous group).
27 However, when this happens, you will not be informed.

28 At the beginning of this part, you will receive 200 ECUs. It is your initial wealth. In ad-
29 dition to your initial wealth, you will receive an endowment of 19 ECUs at the beginning
30 of each period. In each period a loss of 200 ECUs can occur randomly. [PC: If this loss

1 arises, each member of the group will bear $\frac{1}{4}$ of the cost, that is, 50 ECUs.] [PR: If this
2 loss arises, the members of the group will have to bear it collectively.]

3 **Tasks**

4 Task 1) In every period, you will have to choose how many ECUs from your endowment
5 (integer between 0 and 19) you are willing to give in order to decrease the probability of
6 the loss of 200 ECUs occurring; and how many ECUs you want to keep for yourself.

7 The probability of the loss occurring decreases as your contribution **and** the contributions
8 of the 3 other members of the group increase. Nevertheless when you make your decision,
9 you will not know the choice of the 3 other members and the four of you will make your
10 decisions simultaneously.

11 In order to help you understand how the probability changes with the decisions of each
12 member of the group, you can refer to Table 1. In this table, your choice of contribution
13 is indicated in the first column. The first line represents the average contribution of the
14 3 other members of the group. The probabilities of occurrence of a loss according to your
15 contribution (1st column) and the average contribution of the three other members (1st
16 line) are indicated inside the table.

17 Let us take two examples at random:

18 Example 1: suppose that one member of the group decided to contribute 4 ECUs, another
19 one 0 ECU and the last one 9 ECUs. Their average contribution is thus 4.3 ECUs (indeed
20 each one of them contributed on average $\frac{4+0+9}{3} = 4.3$ ECUs). If you decide to contribute
21 14 ECUs, the probability of occurrence of the loss is, in this case, of 16.3%.

22 Example 2: suppose that one member of the group decided to contribute 10 ECUs, an-
23 other one 14 ECU and the last one 18 ECUs. Their average contribution is thus 14 ECUs
24 (indeed each one of them contributed on average $\frac{10+14+18}{3} = 14$ ECUs). If you decide to
25 contribute 6 ECUs, the probability of occurrence of the loss is, in this case, of 9.9%.

26 Note that if the 4 members contribute the minimum amount (0 ECU), the probability of
27 the loss occurring is equal to 100% (the loss occurs with certainty); on the contrary, if the
28 4 members make the maximum contribution (19 ECUs), the probability decreases to 0%
29 (there is no loss).

30 Task 2) In every period, once you will have made your contribution decision, you will have
31 to indicate what you think the other members decided. You will indicate what you think

1 the average contribution of the 3 other members (integer between 0 and 19) will be for this
2 period. The closer your answer is to the actual one, the more you earn. If your estimation
3 is correct or not more than 0.5 ECU away from the actual average contribution, you will
4 earn 6 additional ECUs. If your answer is further off than 0.5 ECU, you will earn 3 ECUs
5 divided by the (absolute) distance between your estimation and the actual value.

6 Let us take two examples at random:

7 Example 1: you believe that the 3 other members of the group will contribute on average
8 5 ECUs. Thus, you tell the computer 5. It turns out that the exact answer was 5.3 ECUs.
9 You earn 6 ECUs because your answer is only 0.3 ECU away from the actual one and this
10 gap is lower than 0.5.

11 Example 2: you believe that the 3 other members of the group will contribute on average
12 17 ECUs. Thus, you tell the computer 17. It turns out that the exact answer was 12.7
13 ECUs. You earn $\frac{3}{4.3}$ ECUs (i.e., 0.7 ECU) because your answer is 4.3 ECUs away from the
14 actual one and this gap is higher than 0.5.

15 Once each member has expressed their belief on the average contribution of the three
16 others, the computer will determine randomly, according to the probability corresponding
17 to the decisions of the 4 members of the group, whether the loss occurs or not.

18 The periods are independent from each other, meaning that if a loss occurs in a period, it
19 does not affect the probability of occurrence in the next ones.

20 **Earnings**

21 [PR: If a loss of 200 ECUs occurs, you will have to bear a share that depends on your
22 contribution **and** on the contributions of the 3 other members of the group. The more you
23 contribute with respect to the contribution of the 3 other members, the lower this share.
24 If the four of you contribute the same amount, the share you will all have to bear will be
25 identical.

26 In order to help you understand how your share changes with the decisions of each mem-
27 ber of the group, you can refer to Table 2. In this table, your choice of contribution is
28 indicated in the first column. The first line represents the average contribution of the 3
29 other members of the group. The shares of the loss you will have to bear, if it occurs,
30 according to your contribution (1st column) and the average contribution of the 3 other
31 members (1st line) are indicated inside the table.

1 Let us take one example at random:

2 Example 1: suppose that one member of the group decided to contribute 10 ECUs, an-
3 other one 17 ECU and the last one 5 ECUs. Their average contribution is thus 10.7 ECUs
4 (indeed each one of them contributed on average $\frac{10+17+5}{3} = 10.7$ ECUs). If you decide to
5 contribute 13 ECUs, the share of the loss you will have to bear, if it happens, is, in this
6 case, 38.7 ECUs.]

7 Your earnings in every period are the sum of two amounts (earnings for task 1 and earn-
8 ings for task 2) and depend on the occurrence of the loss:

9

[PC:

19 (your endowment) - your contribution (0, 1, 2, ... 19) - $50 \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)$ of the loss) If the loss
+ earnings for task 2 occurs

19 (your endowment) - your contribution (0, 1, 2, ... 19) If the loss
+ earnings for task 2 does not occur]

[PR:

19 (your endowment) - your contribution (0, 1, 2, ... 19) - your share If the loss
of the loss + earnings for task 2 occurs

19 (your endowment) - your contribution (0, 1, 2, ... 19) If the loss
+ earnings for task 2 does not occur]

10 At the end of each period, you will be informed of the total contribution of your group, the
11 resulting probability, the occurrence of the loss and your earnings for this period (earnings
12 for task 1 and for task 2).

13 [ID: At the end of the 20 periods, 4 participants will randomly draw a period and will say
14 it aloud to the other participants. These 4 periods will be used to calculate your average
15 contribution. For example, if you contributed 3 ECUs, 14 ECUs, 0 ECU and 8 ECUs
16 during the 4 selected periods, your average contribution is $\frac{3+14+0+8}{4} = 6.25$ ECUs. The
17 picture and the name of the 5 persons who contributed the least on average (among all

1 the participants) will be **displayed on the computer screen of each participant at**
2 **the end of the experiment.** If, in case of equality of average contribution, there are
3 more than 5 persons who contributed the least, all of them will be viewed.]

4 At the end of the experiment, only 1 in 20 periods will actually be paid according to the
5 conversion rate in euros. One participant will randomly draw a period in order to calculate
6 the earnings for this first part. Each period has the same probability of being selected.

7 Therefore, your earnings for this first part are equal to: 200 (your initial wealth) + earn-
8 ings from the selected period.

9

10 **PART 2**

11 For this part, the conversion rate is **1 ECU = 0.25 €**.

12 In this part, you will have only one decision to make. You will have to choose **one** gamble
13 from 5 different gambles. Your earnings for this part will depend on the outcome of the
14 gamble. For each gamble, there are 2 possible earnings: earnings from situation A and
15 earnings from situation B. Each situation has a 50% chance of happening.

16 In order to determine your earnings for this part, the computer will virtually toss a coin
17 virtually. If it is heads, situation A will happen and if it is tails, situation B will happen.

18 Your earnings will correspond to the earnings of the winning situation of the gamble you
19 will have chosen.

20

21 [Displayed on the screen:]

22

Gamble	Situation A (50%)	Situation B (50%)
1	12 ECUs	12 ECUs
2	18 ECUs	10 ECUs
3	24 ECUs	8 ECUs
4	30 ECUs	6 ECUs
5	36 ECUs	4 ECUs

Average contribution of the 3 other members of the group

	0	0.3	0.7	1	1.3	1.7	2	2.3	2.7	3	3.3	3.7	4	4.3	4.7	5	5.3	5.7	6	6.3	6.7	7	7.3	7.7	8	8.3	8.7	9	9.3
0	50.0	50.7	51.4	52.1	52.8	53.5	54.3	55.1	55.9	56.7	57.6	58.5	59.4	60.3	61.3	62.3	63.3	64.4	65.5	66.7	67.9	69.1	70.4	71.7	73.1	74.5	76.0	77.6	79.2
1	48.0	48.6	49.3	50.0	50.7	51.4	52.2	52.9	53.7	54.5	55.4	56.3	57.1	58.1	59.0	60.0	61.0	62.1	63.2	64.3	65.5	66.7	67.9	69.2	70.6	72.0	73.5	75.0	76.6
2	45.9	46.6	47.2	47.9	48.6	49.3	50.0	50.7	51.5	52.3	53.1	54.0	54.8	55.7	56.7	57.6	58.6	59.6	60.7	61.8	63.0	64.2	65.4	66.7	68.0	69.4	70.8	72.3	73.9
3	43.8	44.4	45.1	45.7	46.4	47.1	47.8	48.5	49.2	50.0	50.8	51.6	52.5	53.3	54.2	55.2	56.1	57.1	58.2	59.3	60.4	61.5	62.7	64.0	65.3	66.7	68.1	69.6	71.1
4	41.7	42.3	42.9	43.5	44.1	44.8	45.5	46.2	46.9	47.6	48.4	49.2	50.0	50.8	51.7	52.6	53.6	54.5	55.6	56.6	57.7	58.8	60.0	61.2	62.5	63.8	65.2	66.7	68.2
5	39.4	40.0	40.6	41.2	41.8	42.4	43.1	43.8	44.4	45.2	45.9	46.7	47.5	48.3	49.1	50.0	50.9	51.9	52.8	53.8	54.9	56.0	57.1	58.3	59.6	60.9	62.2	63.6	65.1
6	37.1	37.7	38.2	38.8	39.4	40.0	40.6	41.3	41.9	42.6	43.3	44.1	44.8	45.6	46.4	47.3	48.1	49.1	50.0	51.0	52.0	53.1	54.2	55.3	56.5	57.8	59.1	60.5	61.9
7	34.8	35.3	35.8	36.4	36.9	37.5	38.1	38.7	39.3	40.0	40.7	41.4	42.1	42.9	43.6	44.4	45.3	46.2	47.1	48.0	49.0	50.0	51.1	52.2	53.3	54.5	55.8	57.1	58.5
8	32.4	32.8	33.3	33.8	34.4	34.9	35.5	36.1	36.7	37.3	37.9	38.6	39.3	40.0	40.7	41.5	42.3	43.1	44.0	44.9	45.8	46.8	47.8	48.9	50.0	51.2	52.4	53.7	55.0
9	29.9	30.3	30.8	31.3	31.7	32.3	32.8	33.3	33.9	34.5	35.1	35.7	36.4	37.0	37.7	38.5	39.2	40.0	40.8	41.7	42.6	43.5	44.4	45.5	46.5	47.6	48.8	50.0	51.3
10	27.3	27.7	28.1	28.6	29.0	29.5	30.0	30.5	31.0	31.6	32.1	32.7	33.3	34.0	34.6	35.3	36.0	36.7	37.5	38.3	39.1	40.0	40.9	41.9	42.9	43.9	45.0	46.2	47.4
11	24.6	25.0	25.4	25.8	26.2	26.7	27.1	27.6	28.1	28.6	29.1	29.6	30.2	30.8	31.4	32.0	32.7	33.3	34.0	34.8	35.6	36.4	37.2	38.1	39.0	40.0	41.0	42.1	43.2
12	21.9	22.2	22.6	23.0	23.3	23.7	24.1	24.6	25.0	25.5	25.9	26.4	26.9	27.5	28.0	28.6	29.2	29.8	30.4	31.1	31.8	32.6	33.3	34.1	35.0	35.9	36.8	37.8	38.9
13	19.0	19.4	19.7	20.0	20.3	20.7	21.1	21.4	21.8	22.2	22.6	23.1	23.5	24.0	24.5	25.0	25.5	26.1	26.7	27.3	27.9	28.6	29.3	30.0	30.8	31.6	32.4	33.3	34.3
14	16.1	16.4	16.7	16.9	17.2	17.5	17.9	18.2	18.5	18.9	19.2	19.6	20.0	20.4	20.8	21.3	21.7	22.2	22.7	23.3	23.8	24.4	25.0	25.6	26.3	27.0	27.8	28.6	29.4
15	13.1	13.3	13.6	13.8	14.0	14.3	14.5	14.8	15.1	15.4	15.7	16.0	16.3	16.7	17.0	17.4	17.8	18.2	18.6	19.0	19.5	20.0	20.5	21.1	21.6	22.2	22.9	23.5	24.2
16	10.0	10.2	10.3	10.5	10.7	10.9	11.1	11.3	11.5	11.8	12.0	12.2	12.5	12.8	13.0	13.3	13.6	14.0	14.3	14.6	15.0	15.4	15.8	16.2	16.7	17.1	17.6	18.2	18.8
17	6.8	6.9	7.0	7.1	7.3	7.4	7.5	7.7	7.8	8.0	8.2	8.3	8.5	8.7	8.9	9.1	9.3	9.5	9.8	10.0	10.3	10.5	10.8	11.1	11.4	11.8	12.1	12.5	12.9
18	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.9	4.0	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.7	4.8	4.9	5.0	5.1	5.3	5.4	5.6	5.7	5.9	6.1	6.3	6.5	6.7
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Average contribution of the 3 other members of the group (continued)

	9.7	10	10.3	10.7	11	11.3	11.7	12	12.3	12.7	13	13.3	13.7	14	14.3	14.7	15	15.3	15.7	16	16.3	16.7	17	17.3	17.7	18	18.3	18.7	19
0	80.9	82.6	84.4	86.4	88.4	90.5	92.7	95.0	97.4	100.0	102.7	105.6	108.6	111.8	115.2	118.8	122.6	126.7	131.0	135.7	140.7	146.2	152.0	158.3	165.2	172.7	181.0	190.0	200
1	78.3	80.0	81.8	83.7	85.7	87.8	90.0	92.3	94.7	97.3	100.0	102.9	105.9	109.1	112.5	116.1	120.0	124.1	128.6	133.3	138.5	144.0	150.0	156.5	163.6	171.4	180.0	189.5	200
2	75.6	77.3	79.1	81.0	82.9	85.0	87.2	89.5	91.9	94.4	97.1	100.0	103.0	106.3	109.7	113.3	117.2	121.4	125.9	130.8	136.0	141.7	147.8	154.5	161.9	170.0	178.9	188.9	200
3	72.7	74.4	76.2	78.0	80.0	82.1	84.2	86.5	88.9	91.4	94.1	97.0	100.0	103.2	106.7	110.3	114.3	118.5	123.1	128.0	133.3	139.1	145.5	152.4	160.0	168.4	177.8	188.2	200
4	69.8	71.4	73.2	75.0	76.9	78.9	81.1	83.3	85.7	88.2	90.9	93.8	96.8	100.0	103.4	107.1	111.1	115.4	120.0	125.0	130.4	136.4	142.9	150.0	157.9	166.7	176.5	187.5	200
5	66.7	68.3	70.0	71.8	73.7	75.7	77.8	80.0	82.4	84.8	87.5	90.3	93.3	96.6	100.0	103.7	107.7	112.0	116.7	121.7	127.3	133.3	140.0	147.4	155.6	164.7	175.0	186.7	200
6	63.4	65.0	66.7	68.4	70.3	72.2	74.3	76.5	78.8	81.3	83.9	86.7	89.7	92.9	96.3	100.0	104.0	108.3	113.0	118.2	123.8	130.0	136.8	144.4	152.9	162.5	173.3	185.7	200
7	60.0	61.5	63.2	64.9	66.7	68.6	70.6	72.7	75.0	77.4	80.0	82.8	85.7	88.9	92.3	96.0	100.0	104.3	109.1	114.3	120.0	126.3	133.3	141.2	150.0	160.0	171.4	184.6	200
8	56.4	57.9	59.5	61.1	62.9	64.7	66.7	68.8	71.0	73.3	75.9	78.6	81.5	84.6	88.0	91.7	95.7	100.0	104.8	110.0	115.8	122.2	129.4	137.5	146.7	157.1	169.2	183.3	200
9	52.6	54.1	55.6	57.1	58.8	60.6	62.5	64.5	66.7	69.0	71.4	74.1	76.9	80.0	83.3	87.0	90.9	95.2	100.0	105.3	111.1	117.6	125.0	133.3	142.9	153.8	166.7	181.8	200
10	48.6	50.0	51.4	52.9	54.5	56.3	58.1	60.0	62.1	64.3	66.7	69.2	72.0	75.0	78.3	81.8	85.7	90.0	94.7	100.0	105.9	112.5	120.0	128.6	138.5	150.0	163.6	180.0	200
11	44.4	45.7	47.1	48.5	50.0	51.6	53.3	55.2	57.1	59.3	61.5	64.0	66.7	69.6	72.7	76.2	80.0	84.2	88.9	94.1	100.0	106.7	114.3	123.1	133.3	145.5	160.0	177.8	200
12	40.0	41.2	42.4	43.8	45.2	46.7	48.3	50.0	51.9	53.8	56.0	58.3	60.9	63.6	66.7	70.0	73.7	77.8	82.4	87.5	93.3	100.0	107.7	116.7	127.3	140.0	155.6	175.0	200
13	35.3	36.4	37.5	38.7	40.0	41.4	42.9	44.4	46.2	48.0	50.0	52.2	54.5	57.1	60.0	63.2	66.7	70.6	75.0	80.0	85.7	92.3	100.0	109.1	120.0	133.3	150.0	171.4	200
14	30.3	31.3	32.3	33.3	34.5	35.7	37.0	38.5	40.0	41.7	43.5	45.5	47.6	50.0	52.6	55.6	58.8	62.5	66.7	71.4	76.9	83.3	90.9	100.0	111.1	125.0	142.9	166.7	200
15	25.0	25.8	26.7	27.6	28.6	29.6	30.8	32.0	33.3	34.8	36.4	38.1	40.0	42.1	44.4	47.1	50.0	53.3	57.1	61.5	66.7	72.7	80.0	88.9	100.0	114.3	133.3	160.0	200
16	19.4	20.0	20.7	21.4	22.2	23.1	24.0	25.0	26.1	27.3	28.6	30.0	31.6	33.3	35.3	37.5	40.0	42.9	46.2	50.0	54.5	60.0	66.7	75.0	85.7	100.0	120.0	150.0	200
17	13.3	13.8	14.3	14.8	15.4	16.0	16.7	17.4	18.2	19.0	20.0	21.1	22.2	23.5	25.0	26.7	28.6	30.8	33.3	36.4	40.0	44.4	50.0	57.1	66.7	80.0	100.0	133.3	200
18	6.9	7.1	7.4	7.7	8.0	8.3	8.7	9.1	9.5	10																			

1 **POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE**

2 *The name of the variables used in Table 5 are in brackets.*

3 **1. Your age:** [Age]

4 **2. Your sex:** *Male; Female* [Female]

5 **3. Your degree:** *Bachelor; Master; PhD*

6 **4. Your field of study:** *Law; Economics and Management* [Econ-manag]; *Literature and Languages;*
7 *Hard sciences; Psychology and Sociology; Political science; Other (please specify)*

8 **5. In everyday life, do you think that you are a person who rather takes risks or a rather**
9 **careful person?** Please indicate on a scale of 0 to 10 where do you think you stand; 0 standing for a very
10 careful person and 10 for a person who loves taking risks. *0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10* [Risk-seeking]

11 **6. In everyday life, do you think that you try to help other people or that you only care about**
12 **your own concerns?** Please indicate on a scale of 0 to 10 where do you think you stand; 0 standing for
13 a person who loves helping others and 10 for a person who acts in their own interest. *0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7;*
14 *8; 9; 10*

15 **7. Generally speaking, do you think that we can trust most people or that we must be very**
16 **careful with people?** *We can trust most people; We must be very careful with people* [Distrust]

17 **8. During the experiment, which information did guide your decisions?** *Only your payoff* [Earn-
18 ings]; *Your payoff and others' payoff such that they do not have less than you; Your payoff and others'*
19 *payoff such that they do not have more than you; Your payoff and others' payoff such that they have no*
20 *more and no less than you*

21 **9. Which criteria did guide your decisions during the experiment?**

22 **10. In your opinion, what was the objective of this experiment?**

1 A.2 Proof of Prediction 1

A comparison between x_i^{PR} and x_i^{PC} consists in comparing (7) with (5), that is:

$$\frac{\partial E[\Pi_i^{PC}(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)]}{\partial x_i} = 0 \Leftrightarrow -\frac{\partial p(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)}{\partial x_i} \frac{H}{4} = -\frac{\partial R(x_i)}{\partial x_i}$$

with:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial E[\Pi_i^{PR}(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)]}{\partial x_i} &= 0 \\ \Leftrightarrow -\left[\frac{\partial \gamma_i(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)}{\partial x_i} \cdot p(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l) + \frac{\partial p(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l)}{\partial x_i} \cdot \gamma_i(x_i, x_j, x_k, x_l) \right] H &= -\frac{\partial R(x_i)}{\partial x_i} \end{aligned}$$

We observe that both marginal costs of care are equal, but marginal benefits are different. $x_i^{PR} > x_i^{PC}$ can occur if, for $x_i = x_i^{PC}$, we have :

$$\begin{aligned} & -\left[\frac{\partial \gamma_i(x_i^{PC}, x_j, x_k, x_l)}{\partial x_i} \cdot p(x_i^{PC}, x_j, x_k, x_l) + \frac{\partial p(x_i^{PC}, x_j, x_k, x_l)}{\partial x_i} \cdot \gamma_i(x_i^{PC}, x_j, x_k, x_l) \right] H > \\ & -\frac{\partial p(x_i^{PC}, x_j, x_k, x_l)}{\partial x_i} \frac{H}{n} \\ \Rightarrow & -\frac{\partial \gamma_i(x_i^{PC}, x_j, x_k, x_l)}{\partial x_i} \cdot p(x_i^{PC}, x_j, x_k, x_l) > -\frac{\partial p(x_i^{PC}, x_j, x_k, x_l)}{\partial x_i} \left(\frac{1}{n} - \gamma_i(x_i^{PC}, x_j, x_k, x_l) \right) \\ \Rightarrow & 1 > \frac{-\frac{\partial p(x_i^{PC}, x_j, x_k, x_l)}{\partial x_i} \left(\frac{1}{n} - \gamma_i(x_i^{PC}, x_j, x_k, x_l) \right)}{-\frac{\partial \gamma_i(x_i^{PC}, x_j, x_k, x_l)}{\partial x_i} \cdot p(x_i^{PC}, x_j, x_k, x_l)} \end{aligned}$$

- 2 Note that this condition is always satisfied whenever $\frac{1}{n} - \gamma_i(x_i^{PC}, x_j, x_k, x_l) \leq 0$, i.e., when, for $x_i = x_i^{PC}$,
- 3 the share of liability under the proportional rule is higher than or equal to the per capita rate. Since the
- 4 proportional rule reduces to the per capita one when the contributions of all agents are equal, we deduce
- 5 that this condition is satisfied in the symmetric case we consider.

6

1 A.3 Distributions of contributions per treatment



2

¹ A.4 Econometric results

Table A.1: Tobit estimations

	Restart effects	PC	PR
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PC-ID	1.982** (1.011)	1.736* (0.963)	
PR-A	2.695*** (1.014)		
PR-ID	4.268*** (1.019)		1.345 (1.060)
Loss _{p-1}	0.524*** (0.13)	0.606*** (0.161)	0.433** (0.208)
AveragePartners _{p-1}	0.289*** (0.02)	0.309*** (0.026)	0.241*** (0.03)
Period	-.07*** (0.008)	-.092*** (0.014)	-.080*** (0.018)
1 st period in 2 nd group	0.76*** (0.2)		
1 st period in 3 rd group	0.699*** (0.196)		
1 st period in 4 th group	0.694*** (0.2)		
Period*PC-ID		0.031 (0.02)	
Period*PR-ID			0.032 (0.025)
Gamble	-.368 (0.288)	-.255 (0.369)	-.254 (0.427)
Risk-seeking	-.452** (0.187)	-.327 (0.243)	-.712*** (0.276)
Female	-2.236*** (0.778)	-1.452 (0.984)	-2.638** (1.147)
Age	0.13 (0.145)	0.064 (0.179)	0.138 (0.222)
Econ-manag	-.963 (0.781)	-2.910*** (0.998)	1.064 (1.137)
Distrust	0.891 (0.807)	2.307** (1.079)	-.771 (1.132)
Earnings	-.443 (0.73)	-2.590*** (0.979)	1.724* (1.022)
Constant	7.405** (3.752)	8.317* (4.522)	10.866* (5.877)
Obs.	4560	2280	2280
Left-censored obs.	245	177	68
Right-censored obs.	487	194	293

Estimated standard errors are in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.