The article analyses, from a legal perspective, the developments and discussions about the European budgetary framework in the light of the process of de- and re-politicization. It thus examines the margin of discretion of the authorities responsible for the design and the enforcement of the European fiscal rules. The first part of this chapter presents the original budgetary framework and presents the successive reforms that have been made to it. It is shown that the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) illustrate a process of depoliticisation in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Indeed, these reforms can be analysed as a kind of automatisation of the rules focused on financial stability and safe assets, depriving member states of broader political choices. The second part of the chapter then gives an overview of the contestation of the rules and of recent proposals, and especially the ‘greening’ of the rules, formulated by institutions and academia. It thus illustrates a paradox associated with the phenomenon of depoliticisation. Political scientists have already shown that depoliticised governance, by moving decisions away from representative bodies, can have the unexpected effect of stimulating political debate more intensively than would be the case in an ordinary legislative framework. The third part of the chapter analyses the recent proposal from the European Commission. The question of whether this text marks a phase of re-politicisation of fiscal governance is answered in a nuanced way. Processes of depoliticisation and re-politicisation may actually take place concurrently. The chapter concludes by questioning the need to establish a new institutional framework to arbitrate between the different goals which will possibly guide the implementation of the EU fiscal rules in the future.