Estimating and Auction Platform Game with Two-Sided Entry - Sciences Po Open Access Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2024

Estimating and Auction Platform Game with Two-Sided Entry

Marleen Marra

Résumé

This paper develops and estimates a structural auction platform model with endogenous entry of buyers and sellers to study the welfare impacts of fee changes. Estimates from a new wine auction dataset illustrate the striking feature of two-sided markets that some users can be made better off despite paying higher fees. The results also underscore the importance of addressing seller selection when endogenizing (buyer) entry onto auction platforms. Quantifying the welfare effects from (anti-competitive) fee changes through a model that accounts for important user interactions enables antitrust policy to be applied to such markets.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
2024_marleen_marra_estimating_and_auction_platform_game_with_two_sided_entry_v2.pdf (2.11 Mo) Télécharger le fichier
Origine Fichiers éditeurs autorisés sur une archive ouverte
licence

Dates et versions

hal-03393068 , version 1 (21-10-2021)
hal-03393068 , version 2 (01-07-2024)

Licence

Identifiants

Citer

Marleen Marra. Estimating and Auction Platform Game with Two-Sided Entry. 2024. ⟨hal-03393068v2⟩
105 Consultations
98 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Mastodon Facebook X LinkedIn More