Optimal student loans and graduate tax under moral hazard and adverse selection - Aix-Marseille Université Access content directly
Journal Articles RAND Journal of Economics Year : 2015

Optimal student loans and graduate tax under moral hazard and adverse selection

Abstract

We thank Kathryn Spier, three anonymous referees of the RAND Journal of Economics, Christian Gollier, and Pierre-André Chiappori for very useful remarks and comments. This manuscript is the revised version of a Working Paper by the same authors, circulated in May 2012 and titled, “Equal Treatment as a Second Best: Student Loans under Asymmetric Information.” This research has been supported by a research grant of the ANR “programme blanc.” Gary-Bobo's research is also supported by Investissements d'Avenir (no. ANR-11-IDEX-0003), Labex Ecodec (no. ANR-11-LABX-0047).

Keywords

Dates and versions

hal-01457311 , version 1 (06-02-2017)

Identifiers

Cite

Robert J. Gary‐bobo, Alain Trannoy. Optimal student loans and graduate tax under moral hazard and adverse selection. RAND Journal of Economics, 2015, 46 (3), pp.546--576. ⟨10.1111/1756-2171.12097⟩. ⟨hal-01457311⟩
44 View
0 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More