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Journal Articles Annals of Economics and Statistics Year : 2018

Strategic Product Design under Duopoly

Abstract

Two duopolists first decide in which proportions to incorporate in their product two different Lancasterian characteristics and then compete in quantities or prices. In the Cournot case, minimum differentiation obtains at equilibrium whatever the degree of substituability between the characteristics. In the Bertrand one, the equilibrium depends crucially on the degree of substituability/complementarity between the two characteristics. Maximal differential obtains if and only if the characteristics are strong enough substitutes. On the contrary as characteristics become closer and closer complements one obtains in the limit a minimal differentiation result. JEL Codes: L13. Keyword: Horizontal Product Differentiation, Lancasterian Characteristics.
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hal-01992047 , version 1 (24-01-2019)

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Didier Laussel. Strategic Product Design under Duopoly. Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2018, 131, pp.25. ⟨10.15609/annaeconstat2009.131.0025⟩. ⟨hal-01992047⟩
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