Convergence in games with continua of equilibria - Aix-Marseille Université Access content directly
Journal Articles Journal of Mathematical Economics Year : 2020

Convergence in games with continua of equilibria

Abstract

In game theory, the question of convergence of dynamical systems to the set of Nash equilibria has often been tackled. When the game admits a continuum of Nash equilibria, however, a natural and challenging question is whether convergence to the set of Nash equilibria implies convergence to a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we introduce a technique developed in Bhat and Bernstein (2003) as a useful way to answer this question. We illustrate it with the best-response dynamics in the local public good game played on a network, where continua of Nash equilibria often appear.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
BervoetsFaure_R4.pdf (418.63 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-02964989 , version 1 (10-02-2021)

Licence

Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives

Identifiers

Cite

Sebastian Bervoets, Mathieu Faure. Convergence in games with continua of equilibria. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020, 90, pp.25-30. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.006⟩. ⟨hal-02964989⟩
65 View
39 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More