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Journal Articles Revue de la Recherche Juridique - Droit prospectif Year : 2016

LE DÉSACCORD RAISONNABLE EN DROIT : LE POINT DE VUE DE L'ARGUMENTATION

Abstract

Since Aristotle, reasonable disagreement exists if each opponent accepts the principle of non-contradiction. Legal reasoning needs an additional requirement : the reasonable disagreement is based on the formal rule of justice that is to say that like cases should be treated alike. Because of the formal rule of justice, the existence of a precedent is therefore a strong argument in favor of a thesis. Persistent disagreement remains on the fact that the opposing views are based on arguments of similar strength. The strength of the arguments is then determined ultimately by the criterion of consistency.
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Dates and versions

hal-03796383 , version 1 (04-10-2022)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-03796383 , version 1

Cite

Frédéric Rouvière. LE DÉSACCORD RAISONNABLE EN DROIT : LE POINT DE VUE DE L'ARGUMENTATION. Revue de la Recherche Juridique - Droit prospectif, 2016, Le désaccord en droit. Nouveaux regards sur l'argumentation en droit, 2015-5 (29), pp.2149-2170. ⟨hal-03796383⟩

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